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  Abstract:  In a series of pathbreaking articles, Sylla argues that successful 
economies experience "financial revolutions" before they undergo their periods of rapid 
growth.  In turn, governments generate these revolutions by putting public finance in 
order, and thereby giving private investors the incentive to create banks and securities 
markets.  In the U.S., suggests Sylla, Hamilton masterminded the revolution.  Might 
Matsukata, he continues, have done the same in Japan? 
  Consistent with much of Sylla's work, Japan did indeed experience a financial 
revolution in the late 19th century.  Matsukata, however, did not mastermind the 
revolution in advance of private-sector demand.  Instead, private investors created the 
financial infrastructure in response to demand from industrial firms.  What is more, most 
firms (at least in the pivotal silk industry) raised the funds they needed through trade 
credit rather than securities markets or banks.   
  In this environment, the financial revolution contributed to economic growth in 
three ways:  (a) the new securities markets funded the very largest firms, particularly the 
railroad firms; (b) the new banks sold the transactional services that merchants used to 
provide their trade credit, and (c) the banks supplied some of the funds that the merchants 
as intermediaries then re-lent to the manufacturing firms. 
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  Most rich societies have institutional structures that give people incentives to 
invest, and most societies with investment-inducing institutions grow rich.  But do good 
institutional structures promote economic growth?  Do rich people have a preference for 
good structures?  Or does some third factor prompt people both to promote good 
institutions and to invest at efficient levels? 
  Where many scholars use modern cross-country panel data sets to explore the do-
good-institutions-drive-growth puzzle, Richard Sylla takes a different approach.  Rather 
than manipulate big data sets of 20th-century economies, he studies a few prominent 
high-growth economies intensively and historically.  On that basis, he suggests that those 
societies that grow rapidly tend to have experienced "financial revolutions" immediately 
before their spurt.   
  Through these financial revolutions, explains Sylla, countries acquire 
sophisticated securities markets and banking sectors.  Those markets and banks, in turn, 
fund the firms that drive economic growth.  In the U.S., Alexander Hamilton 
masterminded the financial revolution.  Might 19th-century Finance Minister Masayoshi 
Matsukata, Sylla asks, have done the same for Japan?   
  Japan did indeed experience Sylla's financial revolution as it began to grow fast.  
Yet as surely as this financial-revolution hypothesis intrigues, it fits Matsukata less well 
than it fits Hamilton.  Although Matsukata may have placed Japanese public finance on a 
sound basis, he did less for private finance.  And although Japan did undergo a financial 
revolution, the government did not engineer the institutional supply in advance of 
private-sector demand.  Instead, private investors supplied the necessary capital to private 
firms (i) in response to industrial demand, and (ii) largely (not wholly, to be sure) 
independently of securities markets and banks.   
  In Japan at the turn of the last century, manufacturing firms raised much of the 
money they needed through trade credit.  In effect, merchants used the institutional and 
informational advantage they obtained through their brokerage activities to earn a 
competitive advantage in the financial market.  To date, most scholars of financial 
transformation have focused on banks and securities markets.  That they did is 
unfortunate.  Particularly in societies where regulatory restrictions or underdeveloped 
legal systems stymie bank or security-market growth, we suspect trade credit plays a 
crucial role in financial intermediation (Fisman & Love, 2003). 
  In the article below, we first outline the financial-revolution hypothesis (Section I).  
We explore its fit with Japan, and the tenuous parallel between Hamilton and Matsukata 
(Sec. II).  We then use data from the silk industry to show how industrial demand drove 
financial supply (Sec. III).  In the process, we stress (i) the relative importance of 
informal non-bank finance; (ii) the relative unimportance of government leadership; and 
(iii) the integration of finance and production through merchants who exploit brokerage-
generated institutional and informational advantages in the credit market. 
 
I.  Financial Revolution and Industrial Growth:
A.  Hamiltonian Point: Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 3 
  In his recent Presidential Address to the Economic History Association (and in a 
variety of other thoughtful studies as well), Sylla suggests that good financial institutions 
beget rapid industrial growth.  Secure property rights and contract enforcement matter too, 
of course.  Harold Demsetz, Douglas North, and others made the point decades ago.  But 
even when firms have secure rights to property and can cut the contracts they want, to 
develop good projects they need funds.  The more readily banks and securities markets 
let them raise those funds, the more rapidly they will grow.  The better the financial 
infrastructure, writes Sylla (2002: 280), the more effective "the acquisition and 
application of both nonhuman and human capital" will become.  
  Supply seldom precedes demand, and Sylla does not claim investors create these 
institutions because they anticipate future demand.  Instead, suggests Sylla, governments 
indirectly lead investors to create them when they stabilize the public fisc.  The "basic 
idea" of a "financial revolution," he continues (Sylla, et al., 1999: 4), is that states "adapt 
their financial practices to capitalist standards."  In the process, they "appeal to the self-
interest of capitalists in the form of an offer of assets that [has] an attractive combination 
of return, liquidity and risk of default."  As the states improve their credit, investors 
create banks to lend them funds and securities markets to trade their bonds.  Once they 
put the banks and markets in place, private firms use them to raise their own funds as 
well.   
  Governments generate this infrastructure, Sylla explains, by credibly tying their 
hands.  They enforce claims against themselves.  They centralize borrowing.  They 
stabilize the currency.  They then approach investors, and investors willingly create banks 
and securities markets as necessary.  When "public finances are put in order," concludes 
Sylla (1999a: 269; see 1999b: 428), "orderly private financial institutions and markets 
will probably follow." 
  To motivate his account, Sylla (2002) cites Alexander Hamilton.  As Treasury 
Secretary to Washington, Hamilton centralized tax and public borrowing.  He adopted a 
national currency.  He backed it with gold and silver.  And he organized a central bank.   
  While that much may be standard history, Sylla collectively characterizes 
Hamilton's measures as a revolution.  Together, he suggests, the steps Hamilton took 
transformed public finance directly, and private finance indirectly.  By stabilizing the 
national fisc, Hamilton caused investors to create a modern infrastructure:  banks to fund 
the government, and securities markets on which to trade both the government's debt and 
the shares of the new banks.  Once the investors did so, private firms turned the 
institutions to their own finance. 
  Indirectly but effectively, concludes Sylla (1999: 250), Hamilton "launch[ed] a 
banking system and a securities market."  Those institutions then became "to the new 
nation's economy what independence and the Constitution were to its political life -- 
fundamental institutions that determined the course of all subsequent development."   
With the financial infrastructure in place, "insurance companies, nonbank financial 
corporations, began to appear in numbers, along with nonfinancial corporations chartered 
to build roads, bridges, canals, manufactories, and the like" (Sylla, 2002: 284). 
 
B.  Japanese Counter-Point: 
  Might Matsukata have played Hamilton to Japan, asks Sylla (2002, 1999; see 
Sylla, et al., 1999)?  In the late 19
th century, he rationalized public finance.  In the process, Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 4 
might he indirectly have caused investors to create the institutions to which private firms 
could turn for funds?  
  When Matsukata became Finance Minister in 1881, he had already served as chief 
of taxation and Vice Finance Minister.  He found the treasury in dire straits.  Most 
famous for the deflation he engineered in the early 1880s, in fact he also took several 
Hamiltonian steps to fix the mess:  slash government expenses, establish the Bank of 
Japan, privatize government firms, restructure the national debt.  What is more, during 
his tenure entrepreneurs did create banks (Table 1).  And by 1886 the yen was stable 
enough that he could back it with silver.   
  [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
  Matsukata eventually resigned as Finance Minister, but he continued to move in 
and out of government over the rest of the century.  After controlling the Finance 
Ministry until 1891, he became Prime Minister for a year.  He returned as Finance 
Minister for a few months in 1895, became Prime Minister again from 1896 to 1898 
(concurrently holding the Finance Ministerial post), and worked again exclusively as 
Finance Minister from 1898 to 1900.   
  Might not the reforms Matsukata accomplished in his first ministerial stint, asks 
Sylla, have caused in the 1880s "a financial revolution" (Sylla's [2002: 282] words)?  
They did include the entire Hamiltonian panoply: according to Sylla, "sound public 
finances and public debt management, stable money, sound banking, a good central bank, 
securities markets, and sound institutional investors such as insurance companies."
1  As 
Sylla (2002: 290) summarized the situation: 
Matsukata like Hamilton installed a modern financial system for his country.  It 
encompassed the establishment of every one of the key components of financial 
systems that had arisen in earlier modernizing economies.  Almost immediately 
Japan began to grow rapidly and become a major player on the world's stage. 
 
II.  Industrial Finance in Late 19th-Century Japan: 
A.  Meiji (1868-1912) Infrastructure:
 1.    The changes. -- For Japan during the closing decades of the 19
th century, the 
extensive financial reforms constituted a corner of a much broader-ranging set of 
institutional changes.  U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry may have initiated the process 
when he demanded trading rights in 1853, but the change began in earnest in 1868.  That 
year, samurai from several out-of-power clans grabbed control.  Through what was 
nominally an imperial restoration but functionally a coup d'etat, they ousted the 
Tokugawa (1600-1868) shogunate.   
  Once in office, these samurai engineered nothing less than a total transformation 
in government.  Immediately, they opened the country to foreign trade.  They abolished 
political barriers to inter-regional trade (1871).  They hired a modern police force (1871-
                     
1 For this article, we take Matsukata's place in the financial transformation as given.  In fact, the 
actual role he played is the subject of considerable dispute.  Although some scholars (e.g., Muroyama, 
2004) do stress the break between Matsukata's policies and those of his predecessor Okuma, the claim 
remains controversial (see generally Oishi, 1989).  Much of the evidence for Matsukata's achievements 
rests on documents compiled for the purpose of strengthening his historical legacy; the 1880s deflation 
began before Matsukata's first tenure; corrected for this deflation government expenditures actually rose 
under Matsukata's tenure; and Matsukata's later tenure saw massive inflation (see Table 11 below).   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 5 
72).  They appointed judges who enforced contracts and property rights (1875; see 
Someno, 1958; Takahashi, 1968: 76 et seq.).  They declared (and through the new 
property rights regime made credible) an end to forced exactions from wealthy merchants 
and industrialists.  They cancelled stipends to the samurai (1876).  And they quelled an 
insurrection within their own ranks (1877).   
  Once they had put the military uprising behind them, these ex-samurai-turned-
oligarchs continued their massive institutional reforms.  In their zeal to "get the 
institutional structure right," they reformed and re-reformed.  Granted, they reformed 
with a zeal that might itself have threatened to destabilize investment.  Might -- but 
ultimately it did not destabilize, for a simple reason:  the regimes with which they 
experimented (French, German, and Anglo-American) all protected trade and property 
rights, and in an essentially similar manner.   
  Yet the frequency with which the oligarchs replaced their legal codes does destroy 
any notion that "legal families" might be exogenous (e.g., Levine, 2004, and the many 
articles in the wake of La Porta, et al., 1998).  In 1880, they adopted French-based 
Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes.  They then replaced the procedural code with a 
German-based code in 1890 and the Criminal Code with a similarly Germanic version in 
1907.  They adopted a Napoleonic Civil Code in 1890, but swapped it for a Prussian one 
in 1898.  They fashioned a Commercial Code that blended French, Germany and English 
elements in 1890.  They then abandoned it for a more exclusively German version in 
1899, and added an overlay of Anglo-American trust and commercial legislation in 1905 
and 1922.  And once they had Western-style universities in place, they swapped the 
judges they had hired earlier for more professionally trained ones (Ramseyer & 
Rosenbluth, 1995: 75-82). 
 
 2.    Implications for research. -- For our study, this chronology poses a problem.  
The government began its financial reforms at the very point that it had quelled the 
military uprising and turned to consolidate a radical set of institutional changes.  At the 
very point that it engineered financial changes, it adopted others that protected property 
rights, enforced contracts, and promoted international and interregional trade.  On the one 
hand, Sylla suggests that financial reform generates growth; on the other, scholars in the 
Demsetz-North tradition argue the need for trade and property rights.  We propose to 
explore the relative importance of the two sets of institutional changes, yet their very 
simultaneity presents a conundrum:  at the very point when the government engineered 
Sylla’s financial revolution, it also adopted Demsetz-North’s stable property rights and 
free trade arrangements.  At the very time that investors created banks and securities 
markets, the government stabilized the returns to investment, created a national market 
for goods and services, and integrated Japan into the world trading order.   
  Perhaps in some countries scholars can ask whether a financial revolution 
preceded or followed stable property rights and industrial growth.  In Japan, we cannot.  
Perhaps Matsukata did engineer a financial revolution.  If so, he engineered it at the same 
time other bureaucrats installed basic property and trading rights, and at the same time 
private firms pushed the economy toward spectacular growth.   
  Unable to declare which set of reforms came first (answer:  neither), we begin by 
exploring the mechanism behind Sylla’s financial-revolution hypothesis.  Toward that 
end, we ask whether the reforms that facilitated government borrowing drove the Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 6 
development (as the hypothesis posits) of banks and exchanges (Sec. B).  We turn to 
industrial finance, and ask where those firms most critical to the turn-of-the-century 
economy obtained their funds.  We start at the very largest firms (Sec. C).  We conclude 
with two small-firm sectors that played key roles in the late 19th-century economy:  silk 
reeling (Sec. III.A) and weaving (Secs. III.B, C). 
 
B.  Banks and Exchanges:
 1.    The puzzle. -- The financial-revolution hypothesis posits a clear mechanism:  
governments transform the financial sector by putting the public fisc in order, and that 
expanded sector then facilitates industrial growth.  Governments first improve their credit 
quality.  Investors respond by willingly lending.  To facilitate their direct loans to the 
government, they organize banks.  To trade their securitized loans to the government (and 
the shares of the new banks), they organize exchanges.  Once they install the banks and 
exchanges to lend to the government, they use them to fund private firms besides.  In the 
U.S., Hamilton reformed the public fisc and thereby transformed finance.  In Japan, asks 
Sylla, might Matsukata have done the same? 
 
 2.    Banks. -- As nicely as the hypothesis seems to fit the late 18th-century U.S., it 
founders a bit on Matsukata's reforms.  Take the issue of whether Matsukata promoted 
banking growth during his early years, and whether those banks then funded an industrial 
boom.  During Matsukata's early years in the Finance Ministry, the number of banks did 
increase:  from 239 in 1881 to 353 by 1890.  Not until the 1890s, though, did it begin to 
grow exponentially:  to 1,013 by 1895 and to 2,272 by 1900 (Table 1). 
  Although investors formed these banks while Matsukata ran the ministry, they did 
not form them to lend to the government.  According to the hypothesis, a government 
promotes the banking sector by so improving its public finance that investors willingly 
organize banks to lend it money.  Yet rather than borrow from banks, the Japanese 
government issued bonds.  In 1880 it had 234 million yen in outstanding bonds but bank 
debt of only 15 million yen; in 1890 it had 243 million yen in bonds but only 32 million 
in bank debt; and by 1900 it had 486 million yen in bonds but bank debt still of only 32 
million (Ando, 1979: 19). 
  To be sure, even during the 1880s, investors did form financial intermediaries -- 
they just did not form many banks.  As Sylla, et al. (1999: 2) rightly remind us, "finance 
involves and involved much more than banking."  And in Japan in the late 19th century, 
hundreds of firms other than banks did offer financial services.  Many of these firms 
traced their roots to the Tokugawa period, but because they lacked a banking license the 
Ministry of Finance did not record their activities.  By one estimate, though, the number 
of firms in this informal financial sector more than quintupled during the first half of the 
1880s (Table 2; Asakura, 1961). 
  [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
  What is more, even if the banks did not lend directly to the government, they did 
buy government bonds.  Indirectly to be sure, investors did fund the government through 
the banks.  They deposited their savings with banks, and the banks then used the money 
to buy government bonds.  According to Table 1, in 1880 the banks lent 43.6 million yen.  Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 7 
Concomitantly, the 153 "national banks"  held 65 million yen's worth of government 
bonds.
2   
  Nevertheless, that the banks held the government bonds fundamentally misleads.  
Although the hypothesis posits that investors form banks to lend to the reformed 
government, Japanese banks bought government bonds only because they had to buy 
them.  They did not hold the bonds because they liked their investment potential.  They 
held the bonds because they wanted to issue paper money.  By regulatory fiat, to earn 
signorage they had to hold government securities (Noda,1980: 52). 
 
 3.    Exchanges. -- Or take the question of whether through his reforms Matsukata 
induced investors to form securities exchanges.  As Sylla (2002: 298) himself properly 
notes, investors organized the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges in 1877-1878 -- three years 
before Matsukata become Finance Minister.  What is more, Matsukata himself did not 
use bond finance anyway.  Instead, during his tenure in the Finance Ministry he kept the 
amount of outstanding bonds largely unchanged.  In 1881, the government had 231 
million yen in bonds outstanding.  By 1891 it had raised that amount only to 243 million 
(Table 3).   
  [Insert Table 3 about here.] 
  Granted, investors did organize the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges to trade 
government bonds.  In 1878, they traded 8.7 million yen in government bonds (face 
value) on the newly formed Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), but the shares of only 4 firms.  
Even by 1880 they traded 73 million yen in government bonds but the shares of only 25 
firms (TSE, 1928: app. 24, app. 53).  On the Osaka Stock Exchange (OSE), they traded 
no stocks in 1878, and by 1880 still traded far more in national bonds than in stocks (OSE, 
1928: app. 1). 
  Although the late 19th-century Japanese government twice floated massive 
amounts of bonds, only once did it decide to float them because it had good credit.  First, 
during the Tokugawa period the samurai had served as hereditary salaried bureaucrats to 
the many domains.  In 1876, the oligarchs decided to abolish their status.  In 
compensation, they issued the samurai bonds with a face amount of 174 million yen 
(Noda, 1980: 40).   
  The oligarchs did not issue these bonds because of any access to credit; they 
issued them because they could force the samurai to take them.  Theirs was not a popular 
move.  The summarily fired samurai responded by organizing a counter-coup, and the 
oligarchs promptly crushed them (to be sure, they could crush them effectively because 
they were able to issue a modest amount of additional bonds to pay their expenses; Table 
3).   
                     
2 Noda (1980: 42).  The distinction between "national" and "private" banks reflects the regulatory 
regime in place when formed; the banks in both groups were nationally chartered private firms.  The earlier 
banks were formally denominated “national" banks.  Through legislative change, these banks disappeared 
by the end of the 19th century, to be replaced by banks known as “private” banks.  By the turn of the 
century, the Japanese banking sector included the Bank of Japan (the central bank), "ordinary" banks 
(primarily commercial finance vehicles; the largest category of banks), "savings banks" (conceived of as 
savings vehicles for the general population), the Yokohama Species Bank (for international trade), four 
banks specializing in long-term finance, and two banks specializing in colonial finance.  Momose (1990: 
191-203). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 8 
  Nor (at least initially) would the 1876 bonds reward their holders.  With only 
haphazard economic policies, the oligarchs faced massive inflation.  From 1877 to 1881 
the price of one koku (about 5 bushels) of rice rose from 5.33 yen to 10.59 yen and the 
market interest rate (for Tokyo) climbed from 10.4 percent to 13.1.
3  Bond prices 
plummeted correspondingly. 
  Second, in 1894-95 the government issued bonds to pay for war with China 
(Table 3).  Absent Matsukata’s public finance reform, perhaps it could not have afforded 
the war, and would have chosen a less belligerent course.  Importantly for our purposes, 
however, not until this 1894 Sino-Japanese War did the government chose to use the 
access to credit it had earned over a decade before.  
 
C.  Finance Among Large firms:
 1.    Relative size. -- According to the financial-revolution hypothesis, governments 
facilitate industrial growth by inducing investors to create securities markets and banks.  
To fund their long-term investments the biggest firms in late-19
th century Japan did 
indeed turn to the former.  The latter, however, they used only for transactional services 
and short-term operating needs.   
  By 1900, big Japanese firms everywhere had ready access to a bank.  Banks 
numbered 2,000 and operated nearly 2,000 branch offices (Table 1).  Although the 
average bank was small, the largest firms did not need to borrow from the average bank.  
They could borrow from the top banks, and the top banks were big indeed.  In 1893, all 
banks together loaned 205 million yen.  Among them, the Mitsui Bank alone lent 11 
million and the Daiichi Bank another 9 million (Table 4).  Between the two, they lent a 
tenth of all bank loans in the country. 
  [Insert Table 4 about here.] 
 
 2.    Large-firm balance sheets. -- Yet if the largest banks could offer big firms the 
funds they needed long-term, it was an offer the firms refused.  Take the capitalization 
patterns at Toshimitsu Imuta's sample of 44 large firms (Table 5; reproduced from Miwa 
& Ramseyer, 2002a: 135).  To select the firms, Imuta first examined all firms that 
published their balance sheet in the Osaka Asahi newspaper in the first half of 1898.  He 
then excluded those in the textile, railroad, and trading industries, and those in other 
industries on which he lacked information about multiple firms.   
  [Insert Table 5 about here.] 
  Imuta's firms illustrate how heavily the biggest firms depended on stock finance, 
and how little (at least for long-term investments) on banks.  These firms relied on initial 
equity for 50-75 percent of their funds, and on earnings for another 5-20 percent.  They 
turned to banks for less than 15 percent, and in half of the industries for less than 5.  In 
other research (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002a) we examine funding patterns at large firms in 
the 1920s and 30s.  Among them too, the pattern reappears:  large firms used banks for 
no more than 15 percent of their funds. 
  
 3.    Cotton-spinning and railroad firms. -- To avoid the sample bias created by 
looking only at firms that advertise their financials, take all firms in two industries 
                     
3 Noda (1980: 40-41).  Note the CPI reproduced below in Table 11. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 9 
dominated by big corporations:  cotton spinning and railroads.  In 1893, the mean bank 
had paid-in capital of 203,000 yen (Table 1) and the mean non-bank firm of 7,000 yen 
(Nihon, 1928: 87, 130).  By contrast, the mean cotton-spinning firm had paid-in capital of 
444,000 yen and the mean railroad of 1.8 million yen (1897 data; Table 6).   
  [Insert Table 6 about here.] 
  These large firms did not raise their capital requirements from banks.  Instead, 
they raised them from equity investors.  Tables 7 and 8 (reproduced from Miwa & 
Ramseyer, 2002a: 142, 144) present the capitalization patterns at the railroads and cotton 
spinning firms.  In 1898, the railroads raised 6 percent of their funds through bonds, and 
borrowed 1 percent from banks.  For the rest, they used equity. 
  [Insert Table 7 about here.] 
  The cotton spinning firms raised funds through banks more than railroads did, but 
not by much.  In 1898, the 52 spinning firms (on which we have data) again raised most 
of their funds through equity.  Generally, they raised 58 percent of their funds through 
stock issues.  In most cases, they did not raise this initial capital on the exchanges.   
Instead, they sold the shares to local business leaders and acquaintances (Miwa & 
Ramseyer, 2000; 2002b: 295-97).   
  These firms raised another 10 percent through earnings, and 5 through bonds.  
Only 11 percent of their funds did they borrow from banks.  Although the largest half of 
the firms raised the least from the banks (9-10 percent for the 27 firms with 10,000 or 
more spindles), even the smaller firms borrowed less than 20 percent there (Table 8). 
  [Insert Table 8 about here.]   
 
III.  Silk at the Turn of the Century
A.  Finance in the Reeling Sector:
 1.    Production.
4 -- Brewers of sake and soy sauce played prominent roles in the 
Tokugawa economy, and they continued to play those roles into the later decades of the 
19th century.  In 1874, sake brewers constituted the largest of the manufacturing sectors, 
and produced 16.8 percent (by value) of all manufacturing output.  Textile weaving firms 
(silk and cotton together) followed at 15.5 percent, and the soy sauce brewers with 5.7.  
The silk-reeling firms trailed.  With only 5.5 percent of all manufacturing (6.17 million 
yen), they roughly tied the miso producers (6.14 million).  
  But silk-reeling was a growth industry in turn-of-the-century Japan; sake, soy 
sauce, and miso were not.  Already by 1900, silk-reeling firms employed 227,000 
workers, 34 percent of all factory operators.  By 1912, textile weaving firms led industrial 
production with 21.7 percent of the (greatly expanded) all output.  The giant cotton-
spinning firms followed at 14.1 percent, and silk-reeling at 12.7 percent (169 million yen).  
Sake brewers had fallen to 13.1 percent, and soy sauce to 3.7 percent. 
  From the start, silk thread dominated exports.  Since 1853 the pebrine parasite had 
ravaged silk-worm production in France and Italy (Warner, 1911: 99-100) and the opium 
wars and residual unrest had disrupted the thread supply from China (Ueyama, 1982: 
172).  Because of the long indigenous experience with silk production, Japanese 
entrepreneurs sensed an opportunity.  To that turbulent European consumer market they 
                     
4 Except where otherwise noted, this introductory material is based on Yamaguchi (1966: 3-24); 
Hirano (1990: 3-59); Ueyama (1982). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 10 
could offer what European and Chinese producers could not:  a stable supply.  As the 
Meiji era opened in 1868, silk thread comprised 42.3 percent of all exports.  By 1877 
exports had grown dramatically, but silk thread now accounted for 43.1 percent.  Even in 
1887 it remained at 41.3 percent (see generally Table 9).   
  [Insert Table 9 about here.] 
  In 1877 merchants sent the silk thread mostly to France (47 percent) and the U.K. 
(41 percent).  In 1887 they shipped primarily to the U.S. (58 percent), and secondarily to 
France (34 percent).  In 1897 they still shipped to the U.S. (58 percent) and France (36 
percent).  In the late 1870s, Italy had exported 1,922 tons of silk thread, China 4175 tons, 
and Japan only 1,033 tons (Ishii, 1999: 402-03).  By 1902, Japan had passed Italy and 
China to become the world's leading exporter (Snow, 1911: 104; see Federico, 1997: 11). 
  To spin cotton thread, firms formed corporations.  They raised massive amounts 
of equity capital; imported heavy, advanced machinery from England; hired dozens if not 
hundreds of employees from the start; and often listed their shares on the Tokyo or Osaka 
exchanges.  Because they were large and registered as corporations, they appear 
prominently in national statistics:  in 1898, as 77 firms with aggregate paid-in capital of 
34 million yen (Yamaguchi 1970: 22).   
  Not so the silk-reeling firms.  As vast an industry as collectively they comprised, 
individually they were small.  Generally, they operated as sole proprietorships.  Even of 
the mechanized reeling firms, 88 percent (measured by basin capacity) operated in non-
corporate form (Ishii, 1999: 404).  They hired few employees, and bought relatively 
simple equipment.  As small unincorporated operations, most appear on no national 
statistics.   
  Traditionally, silk reelers unwound the line from the cocoon by hand.  In the early 
Meiji years, the typical worker operated a spindle with one hand while she unraveled the 
cocoon with the other.  She worked in a small shop.  In Gunma prefecture in the late 
1880s, for example, she worked in a firm with only one or two reeling basins.  It 
produced 7 kg of thread a year, and employed fewer than 10 workers.  Compared to its 
mechanized competitors, it reeled lower quality thread and sold it at cheaper prices.   
  By the mid-1890s the mechanized firms began to out-produce these hand-reeling 
shops.  The machines themselves varied, with some based on Italian technology, some on 
French, and many on an indigenous blend of foreign approaches (Ueyama, 1982).  At a 
mechanized shop, the firm mounted multiple spindles on a pole.  It then used hydraulic 
(or steam or man) power to rotate the pole.  By using power to turn the spindles, it freed 
workers to focus on unraveling the cocoons.  In the process, it raised production.   
Because the spindle now turned at a steady speed, it simultaneously increased the 
uniformity of the thread (Ishii, 1986: 82).  In 1889, firms in the hand-reeled sector 
produced half again as much as the mechanized firms.  By 1894 the tables had turned.  
Mechanized firms now produced over a quarter more than the traditional shops (Table 9).   
  Mechanization proceeded differentially across the country.  Of the many silk-
reeling firms, those in Nagano owed their eventual preeminence to their willingness to 
invest in mechanized production.  As of 1880, the firms in unmechanized Gunma 
prefecture still out-produced those in Nagano (Ishii, 1886: 81).  Soon thereafter, however, 
the Nagano firms passed their Gunma rivals (Table 10). 
  [Insert Table 10 about here.] Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 11 
  The mechanization also progressed differentially over time.  During the first Meiji 
years, it reflected a steady increase in the number of mechanized operations.  From 1893 
to 1905, the number of mechanized shops apparently trebled from about 2,600 to 7,700 
(Hirano, 1990: 24).  Later, it reflected an increase in the size of the existing mechanized 
shops.  In 1893, for example, only 18 percent of the mechanized factories had 50 or more 
reeling basins.  By 1905, 39 percent did.   
  Steadily, the reeling firms increased the length of their work year.  In the early 
Meiji years, farmers produced almost all their cocoons in June.  As they learned to 
produce high quality cocoons in July and August as well, the reeling firms stayed open 
longer.  In 1905, the modal Nagano firm operated only 5 to 7 months a year.  By 1911, it 
operated 7 to 9 months (Hirano, 1990: 25).  
  Even if they avoided mechanization, the hand-reeled shops modernized on other 
dimensions.  Many upgraded the equipment with which they prepared the cocoons for 
reeling.  And many switched from hand-turned spindles to foot-powered machines.   
Because the latter freed an operator to use both hands to unravel the cocoon, they enabled 
her to reel more uniform (and higher quality) thread. 
 
 2.    Finance. --  In catapulting their industry into national flag-ship status, the silk-
reeling firms needed long-term capital.  Like the cotton-spinning and railroad firms, for 
those long-term requirements they avoided the banks.  Although they did use banks for 
transactional services, even for short-term funds they borrowed first from their trading 
partners.  Unlike the cotton and railroad firms, they shunned the exchanges too.  As noted 
earlier, most did not even incorporate.  Instead, they operated as sole proprietorships.   
 
 (a)  Fixed assets.  To reel silk, firms needed equipment.  Those who hoped to run 
mechanized operations obviously required more funds than the hand-reeled shops.  They 
would need bigger and costlier machines at the outset.  They would need extra machines 
when they expanded.  If their rivals bought more cost-effective equipment, they would 
need to upgrade their own stock to keep pace.  And if their buyers demanded higher 
quality (as U.S. importers did in the 1890s; Ueyama, 1982: 203), they would need to 
swap their machines for higher-end models.   
  Even the hand-reeling firms needed regularly to invest.  Over time, they would 
change the way they killed the larvae.  They would change the way they unraveled the 
cocoons, and the way they reeled the thread.  Even firms that reeled by hand upgraded 
their equipment or died (Ueyama, 1982). 
  For die they did.  Market competition kept the reeling firms on the brink of 
insolvency.  Aggregate data imply that the industry steadily attracted new firms:  664 
firms in 1879, 1,185 in 1884, and 2,723 in 1898 (Yamaguchi, 1966: 16 tab. 19).  Yet the 
aggregate data deceive.  Silk-reeling firms faced large fluctuations in the international 
price for their thread, and the weather could wreck havoc with cocoon production.  From 
1884-86, for example, cocoon prices climbed 52 percent while raw silk prices climbed 
only 17 percent.  From 1893-96, cocoon prices rose 11 percent while raw silk prices fell 
by 19 percent (Table 11).  Facing these vagaries, firms regularly failed.   
  [Insert Table 11 about here.] 
  The aggregate data suggest steady growth only because new firms replaced the 
hundreds that vanished.  Of the 2,602 mechanized factories in one 1893 industry survey, Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 12 
only 838 remained in 1904.  The rest of the 2,320 plants in 1904 had entered the market 
since 1893 (Ishii, 1999: 404-05).  Some of the new firms would make do with the 
equipment of those that failed (Hirano, 83-98).  Given that many failed because they did 
not keep pace with technological change, however, the more promising new firms 
obviously bought new, improved capital stock when they could. 
  The silk-reeling firms -- even the incorporated firms -- did not raise their funds on 
stock exchanges.  Of the 19 firms with stock listed on the OSE in 1890, none were in the 
silk industry.  Neither were any of the 40 firms listed in 1900 (OSE, 1928).  Of all firms 
listed on the TSE before World War II, only 3 were in silk (TSE, 1928: 27). 
  Neither did the reeling firms borrow the money for the new equipment from 
banks.  Banks did (as we explain below) sometimes discount notes.  They advanced part 
of the cost of cocoons.  They lent some of the selling price of the thread.  But even they 
seldom financed new machinery. 
  Instead, to buy their equipment the reeling firms seem to have turned to private 
savings, to family members, to friends and business associates.  “Seem” -- because most 
government records detail only the firms that registered as legally chartered corporations 
and partnerships, and company archives detail only the firms still in business.  Given that 
silk-reeling firms seldom used such arrangements and regularly failed, only haphazard 
evidence survives.   
 
 (b)  Working capital.  The challenge.  As badly as the silk-reeling firms needed 
funds for equipment, they needed even more as working capital.  On this point, they 
differed fundamentally from their counterparts in cotton.  To spin cotton, firms sank large 
amounts in their physical plant, but used much less as working capital.  To reel silk, they 
needed more working capital and less fixed.  In 1895, even the relatively more capital-
intensive mechanized reeling firms needed far more working capital (22 million yen) than 
fixed (6.5 million yen; Ishii, 1999: 404). 
  A silk-reeling firm used its working capital for cocoons.  Every June (or, 
eventually, July and August), it bought a year’s supply of cocoons.  Because it bought 
from small-time farmers, it needed to pay cash, and sometimes even to offer an advance.  
And it paid a high price.  To produce a bale of silk thread in Nagano in the early 20
th 
century, a firm incurred costs of 522 yen.  Of that amount, it paid 405 yen just for 
cocoons.
5   
 
  The thread brokers appear.  How Japanese reeling firms financed their annual 
cocoon purchases illustrates the crucial role that non-bank finance can play in industrial 
development and the integration of finance with production in the real world.  When 
Japanese entrepreneurs obtained access to international markets in the 1860s, they 
discovered a massive demand for silk.  Japanese farmers already produced silk thread for 
domestic consumers.  They could not raise silk worms and mulberries in the coldest areas 
of northern Japan.  Neither could they raise them in the hottest areas to the south.  In 
temperate central Japan, however, they could indeed grow them -- and there they already 
produced considerable silk thread as one item in a diversified farm portfolio. 
                     
5 Yamaguchi (1966: 26-27); see Fujimoto (1933: 496-99).  This was not a peculiarly Japanese 
phenomenon, as Federico (1997: 164) notes. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 13 
  To exploit this overseas silk market, an entrepreneur faced a series of challenges.  
He needed to convince farmers to expand production.  Toward that end, he needed to 
convince them to drop their other farming operations and focus on silk.  He needed to tell 
them what the foreign buyers demanded.  He needed to induce them to reel according to 
foreign specifications.  He needed to help them buy the machines and cocoons they 
required.  And he needed to ship the thread they ultimately reeled to the buyers in the port.   
  All this presented real challenges.  The foreign buyers and their agents were on 
the coast, in Tokyo and the adjacent port of Yokohama.  Many of the more promising 
farming communities were nestled high in the Japanese alps in prefectures like Nagano or 
adjacent Gunma.  No railroad linked Nagano or Gunma to Tokyo in 1870.  Neither did 
any modern highway, navigable river, or telegraph line.   
  In a few areas like Gunma, silk-reeling firms already sold their thread through 
brokers.  These merchants had long marketed the Gunma silk to urban Japanese buyers.  
They could now try to sell to foreign buyers as well (Ishii, 1986: 83).   
  Elsewhere, some producers would band together in sales unions.  These unions 
would then act as collective intermediaries.  Not only would they negotiate price, they 
would inspect the thread produced and bundle it into large lots of uniform quality 
(Ueyama, 1982).   
  The firms that would play the central role in the nascent industry, however, were 
the Yokohama sales brokers (urikomi ton’ya).  During the late 19th century, 20-30 such 
brokers operated out of the port.  Of the group, four -- the Hara, Mogi, Shibusawa 
(headed by Kisaku Shibusawa), and Ono -- controlled 60-70 percent of the market 
(Yamaguchi, 1966: 8-10).   
  These Yokohama thread brokers did not just sell; they coordinated.  During the 
late Tokugawa years, other brokers had sometimes done the same:  acquire cocoons, 
distribute them to reelers, assemble the finished thread, and sell it to urban merchants 
(Yagi, 1960: 12-13).  So now would the Meiji-era Yokohama brokers.  They did not just 
assemble the silk in the mountain villages and ship it to Yokohama.  Even less did they 
just arbitrage price differences between the two areas.   
  Instead, the Meiji-era Yokohama thread brokers coordinated production.  They 
communicated to the silk-reeling firms the information they would need to produce for 
the market.  They assembled the output, they transported it, and they negotiated the 
eventual sale.  And through their financial role, they helped reelers acquire the cocoons 
they would need to produce their thread.  
 
  The thread brokers lend.  That financial role was new.  Traditionally, the 
Yokohama thread brokers had accepted thread only on consignment (Ishii, 1999: 409).  
They had collected it from the provincial farmers, transported it to Yokohama, negotiated 
a sale to the foreign buyers, charged the farmers for their service, and repatriated the net 
proceeds to the farmers.  The process generally took considerable time. 
  The process put the silk-reeling firms in a bind.  Most were small rural household 
operations.  To maximize production, they needed to abandon their other farming 
activities and focus on reeling.  Yet many months could elapse between the time they 
bought their cocoons and the time the buyers paid for their thread.  For most, this delay 
created a chronic cash-flow crisis. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 14 
  To mitigate the crisis, by the late 1880s Yokohama thread brokers began loaning 
the reeling firms operating funds.  Initially, they advanced part of the expected sales price 
of the thread they took on consignment.  Sometimes they loaned directly.  Other times 
they assumed the loan the reeling firm obtained from a local bank on the strength of those 
expected sales proceeds (Ishii, 1999: 409; Yamaguchi, 1966: 10; Fujimoto, 1933: 499-
503). 
  Eventually, the thread brokers financed the cocoon purchases explicitly.   
Typically, the broker advanced a large portion of the cost of the annual cocoon supply at 
0.5 to 2.0 percent over his own cost of funds.  In turn, the reeling firm obtained a 
guarantee from a credit-worthy friend or relative; it agreed to repay the loan from its sales 
proceeds; and it promised to sell that year's thread through the broker (Ishii, 1999: 409, 
414; Yamaguchi, 1966: 27-28).   
  To this financial transaction, the thread brokers brought both an institutional and 
an informational advantage (see Ishii, 1999: 406).  The institutional advantage they 
obtained by handling the reeling firm’s product.  As Peterson & Rajan (1997: 662) put it 
in the U.S. context, suppliers "rely on their ability to repossess and sell the goods against 
which credit has been granted."  In Japan, the thread brokers held the firm's thread, 
negotiated its sales, and collected its cash.  So long as they sold the silk for close to the 
expected price (and absent a prior security interest), they bore little risk of non-repayment. 
  The informational advantage the thread brokers obtained through two routes, 
routes that again track an advantage Peterson & Rajan (1997: 662) identify in the U.S.:  
an advantage based on information that flows "from product market transactions and 
perhaps from other suppliers."
6  First, the brokers maintained regular contact with their 
foreign buyers.  As a result, better than other plausible creditors they knew the price the 
silk would fetch.  Second, they regularly visited the villages.  As a result, they also knew 
better how close each producer stood to insolvency.  They knew how many cocoons it 
had bought, the condition of its plant, and the quality of its thread.  More than other 
creditors they knew their potential exposure. 
 
  The banks help.
7  In financing the reeling firms, the banks played two subsidiary 
roles.  First, they offered transactional services.  When thread brokers loaned reeling 
firms funds, they used promissory notes and drafts.  Those documents the banks then 
cleared and discounted.  Second, the banks loaned to the silk-reeling firms indirectly.  
They did not necessarily lend directly.  Instead, they sometimes lent to the thread brokers 
who then (fungibility being what it is) loaned to the firms.   
  When the banks did lend directly to the reeling firms, they tended to supplement 
the broker loans.  Not that the banks loaned trivial amounts.  Eventually they lent more 
than the brokers themselves.  As of 1907, reeling firms borrowed 25 to 30 million yen to 
buy cocoons.  Of this amount, they borrowed barely a quarter from the Yokohama thread 
brokers.  The rest they -- especially those that could post real estate as collateral -- 
borrowed from banks. 
                     
6 The same phenomenon characterized silk firm finance in other countries, as Federico (1997: 165) 
notes. 
7 For this account, except where otherwise noted we draw on Yamaguchi (1966: ch. 1, 28-33, 75-
82, 90); Fujimoto (1933: 502-11) Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 15 
  Yet the banks played a subsidiary role in the way they “piggy-backed” on the 
brokers’ institutional and informational advantage.  Fundamentally, the banks followed 
where the brokers led.  Where the brokers lent first, they sometimes followed with 
additional loans.  In making that loan, they sometimes demanded a priority in repayment 
over the brokers, and sometimes demanded a security interest in the cocoons or thread.  
Whether because the brokers kept the safest loans for themselves, because they could use 
their physical control over the thread to undercut any security interest banks held, or 
because they could offset lower interest income with higher sales -- whatever the reason, 
the banks tended to charge the reeling firms higher interest rates than the brokers. 
  And not all banks operated independently of the thread brokers.  Those brokers 
(along with some of the reeling firms) themselves owned several of the banks that lent 
most heavily to the industry.  In Nagano, for example, the Ono merchant house had lent 
extensively to the silk-reeling firms.  When the house failed in 1874, local reeling firms 
responded by trying to form a bank.  They obtained their license in 1876, and with it 
formed the 19
th National Bank.   
 The  19
th financed the industry from the start.  Local thread broker Takajiro 
Kurosawa had been a principal architect of the bank, and one of its largest initial 
shareholders.  The Mogi Yokohama thread-brokerage firm began to amass the bank's 
stock in 1881, and in 1985 became its largest shareholder -- yet the Kurosawa house 
overtook the Mogi the next year.  Kurosawa (at age 39) became bank CEO (todori) in 
1887, and held that post until his death in 1919.  Throughout these changes in 
ownership,the bank remained a major lender to the industry.   
  The thread brokers also controlled several Yokohama banks.  The initial major 
Yokohama bank, for example, was the 1874 2nd National Bank.  The Hara and Mogi 
firms were among its major shareholders.  They were also among the eventual principal 
owners of the 1878 74
th National Bank.  In time, Hara came to dominate the 2nd, and 
Mogi the 74
th (Ishii, 1999: 415). 
  The banks searched for ways to replicate the safety brokers obtained by handling 
a debtor’s thread.  Although they could demand a security interest in real estate, doing so 
obviously limited the firms that would qualify.  As an alternative, once the storage 
industry developed, banks began accepting warehouse receipts in thread (for the 
European analogue, see Federico, 1997: 166-67).  In 1881, the Hara-dominated 2nd still 
avoided security interests in thread.  By 1885, it accepted such security interests for a 
third of its loans, and by 1887 for nearly three quarters.  At the Mogi-dominated 74
th, by 
1886 the bank made over 80 percent of its loans on such a basis. 
 
B.  Finance in Kiryu Silk Weaving:   
 1.    Production. -- (a) What they produced.
8  Although the center of silk-reeling 
shifted over the last half of the 19
th century along mechanization patterns, the center for 
silk-weaving stayed unchanged.  In the mid-Tokugawa period, that center lay in the 
Kiryu district of (what became) Gunma prefecture and the Nishijin district of (what 
became) the city of Kyoto.  At the close of the 19
th century, it remained in Kiryu and 
Nishijin.   
                     
8 For this account, we draw generally on Yamaguchi (1974: 353-57).  Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 16 
  Yet if the principal locations remained unchanged, the work itself did not.  The 
textiles that the weavers wove began to change.  The technology by which they wove 
them began to change.  And the amount they wove changed. 
  As the Meiji era opened, the Kiryu weaving firms wove primarily silk kimono and 
obi (elaborate belts).  Almost immediately, however, thread brokers discovered high 
levels of foreign demand.  In response, they began exporting large amounts of their 
thread.  As they did, they drove up the domestic price of thread.   
  Kiryu weavers responded to the price spike by blending cotton with silk.  By the 
early 1880s, they wove as much (by value) blended thread as silk.  Cocoon producers 
also responded to the spike, and did so by expanding production.  As supplies expanded, 
the Kiryu weavers returned to their focus on unblended silk (Table 12). 
  [Insert Table 12 about here.] 
  Of the thread reeled, the Kiryu weavers tended to use the cheaper variants.   
Foreign buyers preferred the uniformity of the mechanically reeled thread.  Given that the 
foreign buyers were willing to pay a premium for that uniformity, the brokers tended to 
export the mechanically reeled thread.  Kiryu weavers turned instead to cheaper hand-
reeled variants.  When mechanically reeled thread failed the Yokohama quality 
inspections, they turned to that as well.  
  Although the Kiryu weavers produced primarily for the domestic market, over 
time they began to export too.  Through the 1880s, they still produced mostly for 
Japanese consumers.  In the 1890s they began to produce the cloth foreign buyers wanted, 
particularly the plain fabric known as habutae.  By 1898, they exported 70 percent of 
their cloth (though their export share thereafter declined). 
 
 (b)  How they produced.
9  At the center of Kiryu fabric production lay the 700-800 
“weaving firms” (in various circumstances, known as the motobataya or orimoto).  
Although most such firms did weave, more fundamentally they coordinated.  And in 
weaving and coordinating they built on centuries of domestic technology.  From firms 
that specialized in twisting raw thread into weavable form, they bought yarn.  They then 
arranged to have it dyed.  They arranged to have it coated with paste.  The number of 
such preparatory steps varied, but once they had readied the yarn they turned to the 
weaving. 
  Typically, the weaving firm itself wove less than half its fabric.  The rest it out-
sourced to 20 to 30 (and sometimes up to 100) independent weavers (known as chinori).  
For this work, in Kiryu the weaving firm turned to members of farm households who 
wove for the extra by-employment income.  Generally, it lent them a loom and paid on a 
piece-rate basis.   
  In the 19
th century, most weaving firms still relied heavily on hand looms.  In the 
early years of the 20th they began to shift to power looms, and by the First World War 
had almost entirely switched.  They did not shift just to increase quantity; they also 
shifted to produce the higher value-added fabric their buyers wanted.   
  Upon finishing a piece of fabric, weaving firms usually sold it to a fabric broker 
(orimono nakagai or orimono kaigi sho) -- whether bound for domestic consumers or 
                     
9 For this account, we draw generally on Yamaguchi (1974: 357-61, 364-67, 432, 475). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 17 
foreign.  In turn, that broker re-sold it to a metropolitan wholesaler (ton’ya) in Osaka, 
Kyoto, Tokyo or Nagoya. 
 
 2.    Finance. -- (a) Payment.
10  In the closing decades of the 19
th century, 20-40 
firms competed in the Kiryu fabric brokerage market.  They included several that had 
survived the transition from the Tokugawa period and many new firms that had entered 
since.  A few firms dominated this market:  the house of Sawa handled a majority of all 
Kiryu fabric, and the Kakiage and Onosato houses followed.  The Sawa house failed in 
the 1896 recession, however, and by 1910 the Kakiage house had become the preeminent 
Kiryu fabric broker. 
  Although the brokers handled both domestic- and foreign-bound fabric, they 
acquired the two by different routes.  Much of the fabric for domestic consumers they 
bought at the local market.  Six-times a month the weavers and brokers gathered at a 
morning market.  A broker would choose the fabric he wanted and for it give a seller a 
tentative promissory note (kaifuda).  On the note he would specify which and how much 
fabric he wanted.  In the afternoon, the seller would visit his shop and trade the 
preliminary note for a standard (usually 30 day) promissory note.  He then either 
discounted the note at a bank or used it to buy yarn -- in which case the yarn seller 
discounted it with a bank.   
  Kiryu brokers traced this use of cheques not to Western antecedents but to 
indigenous practice.  Largely, the weaving firms and brokers had already standardized the 
practice by the 18
th century.  Before that time, when a seller brought the broker his 
tentative promissory note on the market-day afternoon, the broker had paid cash.   
Eventually, however, sellers began to accept notes, and over time they came to accept 
increasingly long-term notes.   
  By contrast, brokers bought most of their export-bound fabric (as well as some of 
their domestic fabric) on special order.  Generally, a broker obtained the order from a 
foreign buyer or metropolitan wholesaler who specified the type and amount of fabric.  
He then transmitted that order to one or more weaving firms.  When a firm delivered the 
fabric, he gave it a promissory note for 90 percent of the sales price.  He paid the rest 
when he collected the funds from his buyer.  
  Urban wholesalers did not always pay the broker on delivery.  Sometimes they 
paid immediately, but sometimes on extended credit.  As the terms shifted, sometimes 
brokers were net debtors, and other times net creditors. 
 
 (b)  Loans.  Both to increase quantity and to raise quality, weaving firms steadily 
upgraded their capital stock.  To pay for the equipment, they sometimes chose to borrow.  
If they approached a bank, however, most faced resistance.  Although a few of the 
biggest firms had good enough credit to borrow from a bank, most did not.  To induce a 
bank to lend, they needed to offer security.  Yet for security most could offer only fabric. 
  Few banks would lend on a security interest in any fabric other than the most 
standardized varieties.  Instead, they demanded real estate or thread.  Although the price 
of the silk thread could fluctuate too, most thread presented little idiosyncratic risk.  By 
contrast, fabric fluctuated not just by the price of generic (hand- or mechanically reeled) 
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thread, but by the whims of fashion:  not only did it fluctuate as the demand for and 
supply of silk varied; it fluctuated as the popularity of various designs waxed and waned 
to boot (Yamaguchi, 1974: 358, 477).   
  Unable to borrow from banks, the small weaving firms turned to other firms.  
They had many to which they could turn.  Over the decades, however, the largest lender 
in Kiryu was the family partnership known as Mori shoten.   
  Mori did many things.  It sold thread.  It wove fabric.  It brokered textiles.  And it 
loaned money.  Indeed, by the late Tokugawa period it had made money-lending its 
principal business, and at the close of the century its head Sosaku Mori the richest man in 
Kiryu (Yamaguchi, 1974: 452).     
  Although the Mori house loaned money on real estate, it also lent money on fabric.  
It could do so more profitably than a bank because it also wove and brokered the fabric.  
Through that work, it acquired the information by which it could gauge the likely future 
popularity of a design.   
  For the funds to lend to weaving firms, The Mori house turned to the 40
th Bank.  
Although ex-samurai had formed the 40
th in 1878, after the bank established a branch in 
Kiryu the next year silk merchants began assembling its stock.  Soon, they served on the 
bank’s board and Yuemon Sawa of the Sawa fabric brokerage firm ran its lending 
operations.  Under his leadership, the Sawa house borrowed extensively from the 40
th, 
and re-lent to the weavers.  The firm failed in 1896, however, and the Mori then took its 
place.  In time, not only would Sosaku Mori head the brokerage firm, he would also head 
(todori) the 40
th.  In effect, the Mori and Sawa used their informational advantage in the 
weaving industry to arbitrage the bank's funds (Yamaguchi, 1974: 477-78, 487, 521-23, 
526-27). 
 
C.  Finance in Nishijin Silk Weaving:   
 1.    The weaving firm.
11 -- During the late 19th and early 20th century, weavers in 
the Nishijin district wove (by value) about 15 to 20 percent of all textiles.  Primarily, they 
focused on luxury pieces for the domestic market. 
  As in Kiryu, the weaving firm (the kigyoka, hataya, or orimoto; the appellation 
varied) operated at the center of this activity.  It bought its thread from one of 50-80 
metropolitan thread brokers (kiito nakagai) who, in turn, obtained it from one of 10-20 
regional thread brokers (kiito ton’ya).  It then worked the thread and wove it (or arranged 
for others to work it and weave it).   
  The Nishijin weaving firm sold the fabric it produced to a primary fabric broker 
(kami nakagai), who resold it to a secondary broker (shimo nakagai).  The latter 
apparently handled a wider scope of textiles, and resold the fabric to a metropolitan fabric 
wholesaler (ton’ya) with retailing contacts.  As of 1904, 79 registered (with the trade 
association) primary brokers competed in the Nishijin area, along with 53 secondary 
brokers and 55 brokers providing both services.  In addition, roughly as many 
unregistered fabric brokers operated as well.  
  Again as in Kiryu, the Nishijin weaving firm often did not so much produce as 
coordinate.  It sent any as-yet untwisted thread to a firm that twisted it into yarn (yoriito 
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gyosha).  In the early Meiji years, these twisting “firms” were small family operations.  
By 1905, they competed with 18 local factories employing several hundred workers. 
  Once the weaving firm obtained twisted yarn, it sent it to a series of other firms.  
Preliminarily, it sent it to a refining firm (nerimono ya) that gave it the requisite 
flexibility.  It sent it to another firm that dyed it (though increasingly a single firm both 
refined and dyed).  It attached the paste necessary to make it weavable.  It wound it (or 
arranged to have it wound) onto spools.  It hired specialists to design a fabric pattern and 
to translate the pattern into warp and woof combinations.   
  And then the weaving firm wove.  Or maybe not.  Some weaving firms ran a 
household weaving operation.  Others ran a small factory.  And still others outsourced the 
weaving to independent contract-weavers (as did even some firms that wove cloth 
themselves; see Table 13, Panel A).   
  [Insert Table 13 about here.] 
  Because of the intricacy of the upscale Nishijin fabric, Nishijin contract-weavers 
were skilled artisans.  In areas that produced simpler cloth, young farm women 
sometimes augmented their family income by working as contract weavers.  Not so in 
Nishijin.  There, a weaver usually learned his trade through a seven- to ten-year 
apprenticeship with a weaving firm.  During that time, he received a modest wage.  If by 
the end of the apprenticeship he had saved enough to buy a loom, he sometimes did so.  If 
not, he borrowed a loom from a weaving firm and worked as a contract weaver.    
  Nishijin weaving firms steadily invested in new technology.  In the 1890s they 
still wove half their fabric on traditional two-worker looms -- one worker to operate the 
shuttle, and another to raise and lower the threads according to the fabric pattern.  During 
the next few decades, weaving firms increasingly switched to "Jacquard" equipment.  By 
imprinting the fabric pattern onto a stack of punch cards, they could use these French-
style machines to eliminate the need for the second worker (Hareven, 2002: 42-45, 57).  
In the process, they could also treble or quadruple production, and raise fabric quality as 
well. 
  In 1900, Nishijin weaving firms still wove most of the fabric on manually 
powered machines (whether traditional or Jacquard).  Increasingly, however, factories
12 
dominated Nishijin production, and these factories began to use externally powered 
machines.  From 1900 to 1914, the number of manual looms fell by nearly half and the 
number of externally powered looms doubled (Table 13).   
 
 2.    Thread sales.
13 -- Consider the financial consequences as the thread traveled 
from the reeling to the weaving firm.  Ten to 20 regional thread brokers supplied Nishijin.  
Eighty to 90 percent of this thread they acquired from reeling firms on consignment.  
Upon shipping the thread, however, the reeling firm borrowed from a bank the lion’s 
share of the expected sales price of the thread.  To take delivery, the regional broker then 
paid off the bank -- either immediately or within about ten days.  In effect, the regional 
brokers paid the reeling firm 80 to 90 percent upfront.   
                     
12 Defined here as weaving firms with 10 or more workers.  In 1902, 79 Nishijin factories had 10-
19 workers, 6 had 20-99, and 7 had 100 or more. 
13 For this account, we draw generally on Yamaguchi (1974: 211-15). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 20 
  These regional brokers sold the consigned thread to the metropolitan thread 
brokers (or occasionally either to a weaving firm directly or to a firm that twisted thread 
into weavable yarn).  Because the regional broker held the thread on consignment, after 
preliminarily negotiating a sale he contacted the reeling firm by telegram.  If the reeling 
firm consented to the price (apparently he often quoted a lower price than the buyer had 
agreed to pay), he delivered the thread.  After subtracting the 80-90 percent he had 
already paid the reeler, the interest on that advance, his expenses, and his fee (1 to 1.2 
percent), he paid the reeling firm the remainder.   
  The metropolitan thread brokers paid the regional brokers only on a deferred basis.  
At the turn of the century, they generally settled their accounts with the regional brokers 
in cash after about 40 days.  Over time, however, they increasingly settled with 
promissory notes that delayed actual settlement further still.  By 1914, they settled their 
accounts with notes payable only after another 30 to 60 days. 
  If the metropolitan brokers borrowed from the regional brokers, they lent to the 
weaving firms.  For over time, the weaving firms too gradually deferred settlement.  At 
the turn of the century, they still paid for their thread within 30 to 90 days.  By 1914, they 
settled their accounts only after 100 to 120 days.  At those periodic settlements, many 
weaving firms used promissory notes and partial payment to delay payment further still. 
 
 3.    Fabric sales.
14 -- The weaving firms sold their fabric to the primary fabric 
brokers.  In the high-fashion segment for which the Nishijin weavers produced, fabric 
price depended not just on design intricacy and yarn quality, but also on the vagaries of 
fashion.  This risk primary brokers would not bear.  As a result, when a weaving firm 
delivered the fabric, the parties did not set a price.  Instead, the broker acknowledged 
receipt, and each month paid the firm 60-70 percent of the anticipated price of the fabric 
the firm had delivered.   
  Perhaps because of closer contact to the retail market or perhaps because of 
greater diversification, the secondary fabric brokers were willing to bear this fashion risk.  
Consequently, when the secondary brokers received the fabric, they agreed to a price on 
the spot.  They too, however, paid on credit -- generally, 70 percent at the end of the 
month and the remainder at the next June or December.  In the early 1900s, they made 
these biannual settlements in cash.  Over time, however, they began to settle with 
promissory notes, usually payable only after another 50 to 90 days.  In turn, the primary 
broker either discounted the notes with a bank or used them to pay the weaving firms. 
  The primary brokers likewise settled their accounts with the weaving firms twice 
a year.  From the price they received for the fabric from the secondary broker, they 
subtracted the money they had advanced, their expenses, and their fee (bubiki; typically 2 
percent) -- and paid the weaving firm the remainder.  The primary brokers usually settled 
their accounts with the weaving firms in cash, though they too increasingly used 
promissory notes payable in 50-80 days. 
  Typically, the secondary broker then resold the fabric to a metropolitan fabric 
wholesaler.  The largest of the Tokyo wholesalers maintained offices in Kyoto and 
occasionally bought from the primary brokers directly.  Usually, however, they dealt with 
the secondary brokers.  Like the primary and secondary fabric brokers, the wholesalers 
                     
14 For this account, we draw generally on Yamaguchi (1974: 222-27). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 21 
bought on credit.  They paid a substantial portion of the purchase price in 1-2 months by 
promissory note, and settled accounts twice a year.   
 
 4.    Kimura shoten. -- For a closer view of financing practices in the industry, 
consider Yamaguchi’s (1974: 232-52) reconstruction of the books of the Kimura primary 
fabric brokerage house.  Begun in 1753, by the early years of the 20
th century the firm 
had passed to the founder’s seventh-generation successor.  It specialized in obi fabric 
(about half its fabric stock), and of the Nishijin silk merchants was among the more 
successful.   
  During the 1870s and 80s the Kimura firm invested slightly over half its working 
capital in fabric, and the rest in loans.  Of the latter, it made the majority to weaving 
firms,
15 and the rest to secondary brokers (Table 14, Panel A).  The firm largely funded 
its business out of earnings.  Yamaguchi reproduces the data only for the early 20
th 
century, but at least in those years the firm borrowed only occasionally from banks.  The 
rest of the loans it apparently obtained from its business contacts (Table 14, Panel B). 
  [Insert Table 14 about here.] 
  Yamaguchi also traces the path of 287 promissory notes (totaling 20,929 yen) that 
the Kimura firm made in 1881.  Of these notes, at least 227 (worth 15,955 yen) were 
payable to various weaving firms.  Rather than cash the notes, the weaving firms usually 
used them to pay their thread suppliers:  they endorsed 46 of the promissory notes 
themselves (worth 3,454 yen), and used at least 78 (worth 5,490 yen; Yamaguchi was 
unable to identify the endorsers on the rest) to pay for thread.  Of the 287 promissory 
notes, the holders discounted 266 within 23 days, and 130 within 3 days.   
  
 5.    Conclusion. -- In effect, the regional thread brokers financed much of the rest 
of the Nishijin weaving industry.  They paid reeling firms promptly, but let the 
metropolitan brokers delay payment weeks or months, and the metropolitan brokers let 
the weaving firms delay payment a similar length of time.  The primary fabric brokers 
often paid the weaving firms late,
16 the secondary brokers paid the primary brokers late, 
and the metropolitan wholesalers paid the secondary brokers late. 
  In this process banks played a primarily transactional role, clearing and 
discounting promissory notes.
17  When they discounted, they necessarily extended credit, 
of course.  And they also sometimes lent directly, sometimes lent to metropolitan thread 
brokers, and sometimes lent on the strength of thread stock or securities holdings to 
regional thread brokers. 
  Yet the producers themselves (the weaving firms) largely obtained their funds 
through trade credit.  As in Kiryu, brokers used their information about the industry to 
arbitrage the money banks provided -- and relend it to the producers.  The banks had the 
                     
15 These are the advances (about 60-70 % of the expected selling price) that Kimura made to the 
weaving firms upon taking possession of the fabric.  As discussed earlier, it generally accumulated the 
fabric and then negotiated sales in larger lots at periodic intervals.  Because the weaving firms retained title 
to the fabric during this period, Yamaguchi treats the advances as a loan from the Kimura firm to the 
weaving firms.  Alternatively, of course, one could characterize the consignment as an effective sale 
coupled with a loan of 30-40 % of the value of the fabric from the weaving firm to Kimura. 
16 Note the ambiguity discussed in the footnote [immediately preceding]. 
17 In this industry, securities markets do not figure.  Most firms were not even incorporated. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 22 
money, but knew little about the industry; the brokers had better information, but less 
money.  Accordingly, the brokers used bank resources to leverage that information to 
their advantage.  Although the banks funded some of industry, in other words, they did so 
through entrepreneurs with closer contact to the producers. 
 
III.  The Financial-Revolution Hypothesis and Japan
  To explore the determinants of economic development, Sylla examines several 
prominent countries that experienced rapid growth.  Consistently, he finds they 
underwent a “financial revolution” before their expansion.  The U.S. in the late 18
th 
century presents a case in point.  Through men like Hamilton, explains Sylla, the 
government put its finances in order.  Once it had done so, it presented capitalists an 
attractive investment opportunity.  Once it had improved its credit, investors eagerly lent 
it what it needed. 
  In order to finance this newly reformed government, continues Sylla, investors 
created banks and securities markets.  To lend directly, they formed banks.  To trade the 
government bonds they bought, they organized securities markets.  Once they had banks 
and markets in place, they discovered they could use them to fund private firms as well.  
By ordering its own finances, the government had given investors the incentives they 
needed to create the institutions at the heart of modern industrial finance.  With those 
institutions in place, private firms obtained access to the capital that would fund the 
meteoric growth that ensued.  
  The hypothesis fits Hamilton and late 18
th-century U.S., writes Sylla.  Might it fit 
Matsukata and late 19
th-century Japan?  The question raises several component puzzles:  
(i) Assume Matsukata put the government's fisc in order; did investors create their banks 
and securities markets to lend to it?  (ii) Did entrepreneurs use the new securities markets 
to fund the investments that fueled the rapid growth?  (iii) And did they use the new 
banks to fund those investments?   
 
  Did investors create the banks and securities markets to exploit the attractive 
investment opportunities presented by the newly reformed government?  Japanese 
investors at the close of the 19
th century formed many banks, but they did not form them 
to lend to the government.  Fundamentally, the government did not borrow from banks.  
From the start, the banks instead focused on (x) offering commercial firms transactional 
services and (y) lending on low-risk security interests like real estate.  To the state, they 
simply did not lend. 
  Although investors did form the securities markets to trade government bonds, 
they did not buy the bonds because of any reform in public finance.  Ex-samurai took the 
bonds because the new regime abolished their hereditary status and distributed the bonds 
in compensation.  It was not a deal they welcomed.  Rather, in response to the deal they 
organized a counter-coup.   
 
  Did entrepreneurs use the new securities markets to fund industrial investments?  
During the closing decades of the 19
th century, few firms listed stocks or bonds on either 
the TSE or OSE.  For the vast majority of firms, those organized markets simply did not 
matter.  Their funds they obtained elsewhere. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 23 
  Nevertheless, the organized securities markets did fund some firms.  More 
specifically, they provided substantial equity capital to the railroad firms.  To them, the 
securities markets mattered crucially.  And by the turn of the century, those railroads 
would help tie Japan's disparate regional markets into an integrated national economy.   
 
  Did entrepreneurs use banks to fund new investments?  Banks seldom directly 
funded the capital assets at the base of Japan’s economic transformation.  For 
fundamentally, banks seldom lent toward long-term investments.  The biggest firms did 
not borrow their fixed capital from banks.  At least in the silk industry, neither did 
smaller funds.  When banks did lend long-term, they usually demanded low-risk security 
interests or followed the lead of more knowledgeable lenders.   
  Yet to say banks did not aggressively fund long-term capital investments 
potentially misleads.  At root, it trivializes two crucial ways banks did contribute to 
Japan’s economic transformation.  First, they provided the transactional mechanisms by 
which firms traded.  More specifically, they offered the clearance and discounting 
services merchants demanded.  Those merchants then used the services both to advance 
credit to borrower firms, and to link the many regional economies into an integrated 
national market.   
  Second, banks lent merchants funds that they in turn advanced to small-scale 
producers.  Banks rarely lent large amounts directly and independently to small producers.  
They simply lacked the expertise to evaluate the credit risks involved.  Rather, they 
focused on established merchants with strong reputations and real estate to post as 
security.   
  These merchants, however, re-lent to the small-scale producers the funds the 
banks had advanced.  As brokers, the merchants maintained regular contact with both the 
producers and their customers.  By regularly visiting the producers and selling them 
supplies, they acquired information by which to judge their solvency.  By regularly 
selling the output, they acquired information about the vagaries of the market into which 
they sold.  Through that information, they could -- and did -- arbitrage the funds they 
obtained from the banks to fund the industrial expansion. 
  To focus on financial revolutions is right and good, but financial infrastructure 
includes more than securities markets and banks.  Japan at the close of the 19
th century 
did experience a financial revolution.  By listing the shares of the largest firms, its new 
securities markets did provide those firms with liquidity and access to a national pool of 
capital.  By offering transactional services, its new banks did facilitate trade in the inter-
regional product market.  But the intermediaries who directly supplied the capital to the 
firms that drove much of Japan’s growth were neither.  Instead, they were the brokers.  
Through the institutional advantages they obtained by handling a borrower’s product, and 
the informational advantages they obtained through regular contact with the borrower and 
its customers, these merchants provided the link between investors and their banks on the 
one hand, and producers on the other.   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 24 
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Table 1:  Formal Banking Sector, 1875-1900 
 
 
    n   BO   PIC   Pft   Div   Dep   Lns. 
1875     4     0    345    34    26    147    214 
1876     6     0    435        250    349 
1877    27    19   2499        458   1428 
1878    96    38   3560        864   2667 
1879   151    82   4277       1622   3952 
 
1880   191   108   5087       1729   4359 
1881   239   115   5593       2435   5083 
1882   321   126   6618       2356   6996 
1883   350   124   6871       3797   5156 
1884   356   127   7198       4121   5257 
 
1885   359   122   7124       4404   6044 
1886   358   125   7038       4983   6788 
1887   359   137   7923       4620   8670 
1888   348   200   8070  1332   849   7111  11383 
1889   354   208   8424  1292   878   6848  12702 
 
1890   353   206   8872  1377   928   6367  16357 
1891   388   260   9026  1461   907   7044  15502 
1892   405   255   9114  1418   898   8596  14274 
1893   703   339 14245  1396   919 11183  20501 
1894   865   414 15017  1744 1020 13395  23791 
 
1895 1013   577 17649  2628 1658 18441  32285 
1896 1277   832 20989  4699 1491 23455  54782 
1897 1505 1004 21769  4553 2676 30462  51082 
1898 1752 1383 25366  4190 2139 37146  70633 
1899 1943 1730 28713  4730 2698 53461  88257 
 
1900 2272 2220 33613  5126 2795 57084  99225 
 
  Notes:  n:  Number of banks.  BO:  Number of branch offices.  
PIC:  Paid-in capital.  Pft:  Profits.  Div:  Dividends paid.  Dep:  
Deposits.  Lns:  Loans.  Figures are for all banks, other than the Bank 
of Japan.  All yen amounts are x 10,000 yen. 
 
  Sources:  Koichi Emi, Masakichi Ito & Hidekazu Eguchi, Chochiku 
to tsuka [Savings and Currency] 184 (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 
1988) (Hitotsubashi LTES Series 5); Asahi shimbun sha, Nippon keizai 
tokei sokan [Comprehensive Economic Statistics of Japan] 347, 
457(Osaka:  Asahi shimbun sha, 1930). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 28 
Table 2:  Formal and Informal Banking Sectors, 1880-1887 
 
 
       Private Banks  Quasi-Banks*     National Banks   
  No.   PIC.  No.   PIC.  No   PIC . 
1880  39   6280  120   1211  153  43041   
1881  90  10447 369    5894 148  44886   
1882  176  17152 438    7958 143  44236   
1883  207  20487 573  12071 141  44386   
1884  214  19421 741  15142 140  44536   
1885  218  18758 744  15397 139  44456   
1886  220  17959 748  15391 138     
1887  221  18896 741  15117 138     
 
 
  Notes:  No:  Number.  PIC.:  Paid-in capital (x 1000 yen).   
  * Financial institutions not chartered as banks; defined by 
Asakura as "firms engaged in such financial business as money 
orders, money exchange, deposits, loans, etc."  
  
  Source:  Kokichi Asakura, Meiji zenki Nihon kin’yu kozo shi 
[The Financial Structure of Early Meiji Japan] 187 (Tokyo:  
Iwanami shoten, 1961). 
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Table 3:  National Debt Instruments, 1875-1900 
 
 
  Bonds     Military bonds 
            outstanding    outstanding. 
1875   55810       0 
1876   53927       0 
1877  226854    9486 
1878 237364    15000 
1879 235199    15000 
 
1880 234338    15000 
1881 231128    15000 
1882 225511    15000 
1883 217663    15000 
1884 229862    15000 
 
1885 231256    15000 
1886 229994    15000 
1887 237981    21000 
1888 242548    23000 
1889 250053    27000 
 
1890 243237    27000 
1891 242626    26990 
1892 245894    26997 
1893 234815    26994 
1894 231706    66907   
 
1895 320624  136016   
1896 351122  147048   
1897 382953  160141   
1898 391282  160379   
1899 478701  207970   
 
1900 486464  209440   
 
 
  Notes:  All yen amounts are x 1000.  Bonds outstanding:  nominal 
value of national bonds outstanding at the end of the year. 
 
  Source:  Asahi shimbun sha, Nippon keizai tokei sokan 
[Comprehensive Economic Statistics of Japan] 176, 226 (Osaka:  Asahi 
shimbun sha, 1930).  
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Table 4:  Aggregate Loans 
at Selected Large Banks, 1891-1900 
 
 Mitsui  Sumitomo  Daiichi 
1891      7402 
1892      8101 
1893 10939      9251 
1894 11382      9812 
1895  16445   2142 12237 
1896  18072   4310 13109 
1897  20407   5336 12577 
1898  25000   6190 12489 
1899  28150   8164 18241 
1900  23240 10030 20989 
  
  Notes:  x 1000 yen. 
 
  Source:  Asahi shimbun sha, Nippon keizai tokei sokan 
[Comprehensive Economic Statistics of Japan] 521 (Osaka:  
Asahi shimbun sha, 1930). 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Table 5:  Mean Capitalization of Firms, 1897 
 
 
  Food  Chem. Brick Cement  Metals  Machines 
Paid-in  Capital  64.6% 71.1% 71.8% 53.1% 72.5% 66.3% 
Retained  Earnings  15.6   5.3 14.9 18.4   7.3   7.3 
Bonds   3.4   0   0  10.3   0   0 
Bank Debt   5.2   1.8   9.7   4.5  13.2   2.6 
Other  Debt  11.3 21.7   3.7 13.8   7.1 23.8 
 
No. of firms  15   7   8   4   5   5 
 
Mean assets 
(x  1000  yen)  196.7 206.5 57.9  340.4 253.5 596.3 
 
 
     Notes:  Sample construction described in text. 
 
     Source:  Toshimitsu Imuta, Meiji ki kabushiki kaisha 
bunseki josetsu [Introduction to the Analysis of Meiji-Era 
Corporations] 138 (Tokyo:  Hosei University Press, 1976). 
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Table 6:  Capitalization of Railroads,  
Cotton-Spinning Firms, and Banks, 1897-1906 
 
 
  Private Railroads  Cotton Spin-      Ordinary 
      -ning Firms        Banks 
     A     B  A    B   A     B  . 
1897 66  (35) 122542  65  28881  1305    207741 
1898 58  (16) 153925  74  32500  1485    287045 
1899 58  (15) 169999  78  33721  1634    392257 
1900 55  (14) 181267  79  33992  1588    436780 
1901 50  (10) 192811  66  34993  1614    450187 
1902  50  (9) 202604  56 34555  1585   536703 
1903  46  (5) 208286  51 34029  1563   566228 
1904  39  (2) 215922  49 33487  1521   605317 
1905  39  (2) 223337  49 33564  1495   692521 
1906  34  (3) 125948  47 38433  1470 1033763 
 
  Notes:  (A) Number of firms; (B) Paid in capital, in 1000 yen.  
Firms not yet operational in parenthesis. 
 
  Source:  Masao Noda, Nihon shoken shijo seiritsu shi [The History 
of the Establishment of Japanese Securities Markets] 157 tab. 3-10 
(Tokyo:  Yuhikaku, 1980). 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Table 7: Capitalization of Railroad Firms, 1884-1898 
 
 
    1884      1886       1888      1890     1892      1894      1896      1898  . 
 
Pd-in Cap. 5163(100) 8062(100) 14997(97) 38493(95) 46737(94) 59177(88) 89011(91) 169999(92) 
Ret. Erngs    0  (0)    0  (0)   231 (2)   511 (1)   775 (2)  1322 (2)  1587 (2)   3374 (2) 
Bonds     0  (0)    0  (0)     0 (0)   269 (1)  1710 (3)  5778 (9)  5350 (5)  10640 (6) 
Bank Debt     0  (0)    0  (0)   165 (1)  1162 (3)   580 (1)   877 (1)  2316 (2)   2190 (1) 
 
No. firms     1         2          6         12        13        20       27        41 
 
 
Notes:  Current values, in 1000 yen, followed by percentage.  
Bank debt excludes short-term.   
 
  Source:  Tetsudo kyoku, Meiji 32 nendo Tetsudo kyoku nempo [1899 
Railway Bureau Annual Report] 221-37 (Tokyo:  Tetsudo kyoku, 1900). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 32 




    Number of Operating Spindles     . 
   5,999   6,000-  10,000-  20,000    All 
  or less  9,999  19,999  or more   Firms . 
Paid-in Capital  186 (64)  338 (59)  451 (59)  827 (55)  469 (58) 
Retained Earnings    7  (2)   11  (2)   65  (9)  226 (15)   84 (10) 
Bonds    0  (0)   25  (4)   41  (5)   99  (7)   44  (5) 
Bank Debt   47 (16)   78 (14)   65  (9)  153 (10)   90 (11) 
Other Debt   51 (18)  123 (21)  136 (20)  188 (13)  128 (16) 
 




  Notes:  The table gives the mean per firm figure, in 1000 yen, followed by 
the percentage of total firm capitalization in parenthesis.  Bank debt includes 
shakunyu kin and toza karikoshi. 
 
  Source: Toshimitsu Imuta, Meiji ki kabushiki kaisha bunseki josetsu 
[Introduction to the Analysis of Meiji-Era Corporations] (20) (Tokyo:  Hosei 
University Press, 1976). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 33 
Table 9:  Silk Production 
 
     Cocoon   
       Silk Thread   
        Production    
  Silk 
Thread
 Production  Tot Silk    Mach-reeled Hand-reeled Dupion  Exports
1879 37235  1669      982.0
1880 44030  1999      877.0
1881 50242  1729         
1882 49801  1856      1737.0
1883 41475  1712      1879.0
1884 43622  2138      1259.0
1885 32039  1905      1474.0
1886 41716  2696      1603.0
1887 45715  3019      1888.0
1888 44413  2794      2820.0
1889 44426  3624 1338 1968 318  2477.0
1890 43960  3458 1382 1873 203  1266.0
1891 59259  4413 1690 2496 227  3218.0
1892 55526  4493 1941 2262 290  3259.0
1893 63259  4913 2206 2420 287  2229.0
1894 67419  5218 2754 2109 355  3291.0
1895 84681  6410 3389 2624 397  3487.0
1896 68677  5801 3045 2365 391  2351.0
1897 79573  6156 3132 2634 390  4152.0
1898 76025  5898 2955 2594 349  2902.0
1899 94221  7374 3503 3076 795  3568.0
1900 103227  7102 3716 2868 518  2779.0
1901 94732  7068 3890 2674 504  5219.0
1902 95596  7253 4002 2721 530  4847.0
1903 97016  7493 4362 2555 576  4389.0
1904 105963  7487 4486 2491 510  5795.0
1905 102125  7310 4527 2370 413  4368.0
1906 111402  8213 5282 2456 475  6237.0
1907 129636  9198 6137 2598 463  5613.0
1908 132381  10168 6666 2869 633  6913.0
1909 136120  10883 7597 2682 606  8082.0
1910 146286  11905 8384 2846 675  8908.0
1911 158823  12805 8994 3091 720  8674.0
1912 166962  13669 10102 2745 822  10262.0
1913 172183  14029 10693 2387 949  12137.0
1914 165459  14085 10845 2317 923  10289.0
  Notes:  All figures are x1000 kg.  “Dupion thread” was the coaser, 
inferior thread that resulted when two silk worms spun together and 
interlaced their threads. 
 
  Sources:  Shozaburo Fujino, Shiro Fujino & Akira Ono, Sen'i kogyo 
[Textiles] 294-95, 298-99, 308 (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1979) 
(LTES Series v. 11). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 34 
 
 
Table 10:  Silk Thread Production 
in Principal Prefectures, 1886-1906 
 
 
  1886     1896     1906   
Nagano   480   1238 (93%)  1991 (95%) 
Gunma   450    784 (21)   615 (18) 
Aichi    26    176 (88)   536 (83) 
Saitama   139    233 (20)   503 (61) 
Yamanashi   131    266 (80)   458 (84) 
Total  2756   5801 (56)  8213 (68) 
 
  Notes:  The first figure gives annual production in 
1000 meetric tons, followed by the mechanization rate (in 
parentheses). 
 
  Source:  Kazuo Yamaguchi, Nihon sangyo kin'yu shi 
kenkyu:  Seishi kin'yu hen [Studies in the History of 
Japanese Industrial Finance:  Silk-Reeling Finance] 14-15 
(Tokyo:  Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1966). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 35 
Table 11:  Indexed Prices in the Silk Industry 
 
 
    Cocoon    Raw Silk    Spun Silk Habutae 
 CPI Prices Prices  Prices
Exp. 
Price 
1879 33.1 85.5 101.7    
1880 38.0 71.3 102.8    
1881 41.8 102.3 101.2    
1882 38.9 78.5 100.3    
1883 33.4 65.0 92.4    
1884 32.3 53.7 85.7    
1885 32.4 56.9 85.7    
1886 28.5 81.5 100.2    
1887 30.3 78.0 94.5  108.2  
1888 29.8 63.2 88.1  99.0  
1889 31.6 65.3 98.9  103.1  
1890 33.7 67.4 96.0  100.0  
1891 32.3 69.6 83.8  89.8  
1892 30.1 71.7 107.1  89.8  
1893 30.4 73.8 124.3  101.0  
1894 31.4 75.9 108.6  111.2  
1895 34.4 78.0 119.6  127.6  
1896 37.8 80.2 104.6  122.4  
1897 42.2 82.3 113.2  123.5  
1898 45.7 84.4 126.0  133.7  
1899 43.1 89.8 156.5  172.4  
1900 48.5 92.7 138.8  177.5 164.3
1901 47.4 83.4 123.9  141.8 153.6
1902 49.3 90.9 135.8  150.0 145.7
1903 51.7 102.3 144.3  168.4 151.7
1904 52.9 88.7 129.9   152.3
1905 55.0 97.8 138.3   150.7
1906 56.0 109.1 149.0   163.1
1907 61.9 129.6 189.9   182.0
1908 59.8 93.2 141.8   153.7
1909 57.4 93.2 138.3   141.5
1910 57.6 88.7 135.8   140.0
1911 61.9 93.2 135.8   139.8
1912 65.3 93.2 134.6   134.0
1913 67.3 104.6 141.8   138.3
1914 62.0 102.3 140.8   141.7
 
  Notes:  For all figures, prices during 1934-36 are set at 100. 
 
  Sources:  Shozaburo Fujino, Shiro Fujino & Akira Ono, Sen'i kogyo 
[Textiles] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1979) (LTES Series v. 11); Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 36 
Kazushi Ohkawa, et al., Bukka [Prices] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 
1979) (LTES Series v. 8).  Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 37 
Table 12:  Value of Silk Fabric Production in Kiryu, 
in Nominal and Constant Prices 
 
             Production -- nominal prices            Production -- constant prices
        Silk       Cott-Silk Blend              Silk               Cott-Silk
1880 2195  2237 5776  5887
1881 2201  2217 5266  5304
1886  1495 652 5246 2288
1887  1660 786 5479 2594
1888  1825 905 6124 3037
1889 1026  1186 3247  3753
1891 1460  1062 4520  3288
1892 1545  1150 5133  3821
1893 2361  1619 7766  5326
1894 2277  1029 7252  3277
1895 4844  2093 14081  6084
1896 5868  1726 15524  4566
1897 6433  1916 15244  4540
1898 7317  3050 16011  6674
1899  6560 6503 15220 15088
1900  6661 5501 13734 11342
1901  7271 5336 15340 11257
1902 4828  4151 9793  8420
1903 5021  2198 9712  4251
1904 3762  1240 7112  2344
1905 5191  2537 9438  4613
1906 5455  4272 9741  7629
1907 5383  4642 8696  7499
1908 6696  3860 11197  6455
1909 6705  3781 11681  6587
1910 6598  4225 11455  7335
1911 7804  4441 12607  7174
1912 7962  3660 12193  5605
1913 7751  3418 11517  5079
1914 5214  3360 8410  5419
 
 
  Notes:  Constant prices are adjusted by the consumer price index. 
 
  Sources:  Shozaburo Fujino, Shiro Fujino & Akira Ono, Sen'i kogyo 
[Textiles] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 1979) (LTES Series v. 11); 
Kazushi Ohkawa, et al., Bukka [Prices] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 
1979) (LTES Series v. 8). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 38 
Table 13:  Nishijin Weaving Firms 
 
 
A.  Number of Weaving Factories, Households,  
    and Contract Weavers in Nishijin 
 
                     Contract 
          .         Factories  Households    Weavers 
1906 312  1979 4279 
1907 284  1891 4658 
1908 290  1835 4963 
1909 305  1996 5330 
1910 285  2794 6565 
1911 265  2369 7768 
1912 284  2374 8470 
  1913 141  2022 8886 
 
B.  Number of Looms, by Producer Type 
 
                     Contract 
          .          Factories  Households    Weavers 
1905 4189 9006   9128 
1909 6034 8467 10431 
1914 2849 3797   6646 
 
C.  Number of Manually and Externally Powered Looms 
 
  .    Manual  looms Power  looms 
1900 23437    846 
1901 22175    860 
1902 21288    854 
1903 15758    848 
1906 22776  1014 
1907 19932  1284 
1908 20496  1323 
1909 21520  1598 
1910 20300  1598 
1911 20645  1616 
1912 20571  1699 
1913 14709  1673 
1914 12737  1639 
 
  Notes:  Factories are defined as production units with 10 or more 
weavers, and households as units with 10 or (sic) fewer weavers.  
Households includes both kanai kogyo and orimoto. 
 
  Source:  Kazuo Yamaguchi, Nihon sangyo kin'yu shi kenkyu:  Orimono 
kin'yu hen [Studies in the History of Japanese Industrial Finance:  Weaving 
Finance] 218-20, tabs. 9-11 (Tokyo:  Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1974).    Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 39 
Table 14:  Kimura House Accounts 
 
 
A.  Profits and Liquid Assets, 1874-85: 
 
      .   Loans to    . 
            Fabric  Weaving     2dary  
     Profits  Stock    Firms   Brokers     Cash 
1874* 791  4833 1364 282  744
1875 714  3678 2088 322  502
1876 86  4826 1540 701  845
1878 349  2944 2929 870  409
1879* 716  4397 3120 585  970
1880 -1546  4331 3582 686 830
1881*  1632 5168 3568 1502 2832
1882  2219 6353 5987 1213 1147
1883  1490 7296 5408 1680 2050
1885  -21 8804 4364 583 1557
 
  Notes:  * As of July 1; all other figures are as of January 1 of 
each year.  Figures exclude Osaka branch of the house. 
 
B.  Profits, Capital, and Debt, 1899-1905: 
  
    Bank  Other 
         Capital  Profits  Debt  Debt. 
1899*  51056  Not avail.     0   9052 
1900 54066    3010 20740  10670 
1901 59844    3476 15800  16324 
1902  63021   1825      0  15020 
1903  69487   2512      0  10135 
1904  73716   3255   5500  10729 
1905  70751  -3007      0  12849 
 
  Notes:  * As of July 1; all other figures are as of January 1 of 
each year.  Rather than borrow from banks, the brokerage firm acquired 
its funds from the Kimura house trasury, which in turn acquired equity 
from the family.  The family and house treasury owned substantial 
assets beyond those invested in the brokerage firm, but loans were 
apparently taken out by the treasury, with real estate and securities 
posted as collateral.  Capital and profit figures are for the brokerage 
firm; the debt figures are for those of the house treasury. 
 
  Sources:  Kazuo Yamaguchi, Nihon sangyo kin'yu shi kenkyu:  
Orimono kin'yu hen [Studies in the History of Japanese Industrial 
Finance:  Weaving Finance] 232-52 (Tokyo:  Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 
1974).    
 